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Abstract. The essential services that support urban living are
complex and interdependent, and their disruption in disasters
directly affects society. Yet there are few empirical studies to
inform our understanding of the vulnerabilities and resilience
of complex infrastructure systems in disasters.
This research takes a systems thinking approach to explore
the dynamic behaviour of a network of essential services,
in the presence and absence of volcanic ashfall hazards in
Montserrat, West Indies. Adopting a case study methodology
and qualitative methods to gather empirical data, we centre
the study on the healthcare system and its interconnected net-
work of essential services. We identify different types of rela-
tionship between sectors and develop a new interdependence
classification system for analysis. Relationships are further
categorised by hazard conditions, for use in extensive risk
contexts.
During heightened volcanic activity, relationships between
systems transform in both number and type: connections in-
crease across the network by 41 %, and adapt to increase
cooperation and information sharing. Interconnections add
capacities to the network, increasing the resilience of pri-
oritised sectors. This in-depth and context-specific approach
provides a new methodology for studying the dynamics of
infrastructure interdependence in an extensive risk context,
and can be adapted for use in other hazard contexts.
1 Introduction
Infrastructure is critical to supporting modern societies, par-
ticularly in urban areas, where large populations create high
demand for essential services such as schools, healthcare,
energy, water, waste disposal, roads and communications
(Platt, 1991). There has been growing recognition that the
high degree of dependency between different critical infras-
tructures pass on disruptions between interconnected sectors,
both directly and indirectly, as well as to the economy and
society (Platt, 1991; Rinaldi et al., 2001; Chang and Shi-
nozuka, 2004; McDaniels et al., 2008; Chang, 2009; Oh et
al., 2010; Pelling, 2002; Santella et al., 2009). For exam-
ple, loss of power during Hurricane Katrina in 2004 caused
failures in telecommunications systems, which further dis-
rupted the organisation of rescue and relief efforts (Santella
et al., 2009). In another example, the collapse of the twin
towers of the World Trade Center in 2001 ruptured water
mains, and impaired firefighting due to falling water pres-
sure at fire hydrants (O’Rourke, 2007). Yet technical un-
derstanding of infrastructure interdependencies is still in its
early stages (Chang, 2009). In disasters there are few empir-
ical studies of interdependent infrastructure to inform under-
standing of the vulnerabilities and resilience of a network of
connected systems (Santella et al., 2009). Existing empirical
studies focus on the vulnerabilities created by interdependen-
cies, and on extreme disaster events. There is sparse empiri-
cal study of interdependence in volcanic contexts (Wilson et
al., 2012; Sword-Daniels, 2014), and to our knowledge there
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are no studies of the dynamics of infrastructure interdepen-
dence in the presence and absence of hazards, or in extensive
risk contexts.
The island of Montserrat, West Indies, provides a case
study of essential services operating in a long-duration vol-
canic hazard context (eruption 1995–present), where vol-
canic ashfall hazards intermittently affect the population in
the north of the island. Taking a systems thinking approach,
bounded by the geographical extent of the island, we adopt
a qualitative case study methodology to explore the dynam-
ics and interdependence of essential services in this extensive
volcanic risk context.
We centre this study on the healthcare system as a com-
plex system nested within a network of essential services.
Using empirical data, we describe the complex nature of the
interrelationships between essential services, from which we
develop a new classification system in order to analyse their
interdependencies. Then we explore the dynamic transforma-
tion of relationships in the presence and absence of volcanic
ashfall hazards and interpret how this influences resilience
in this context. This provides a novel approach for exploring
the complexities of interdependent systems that adds depth
to our understanding, and provides a new methodology for
studying dynamic infrastructure interdependence. This in-
creases understanding of the characteristics and resilience of
a network of complex systems in an extensive risk context.
2 Background
In the literature, study of the interdependencies between
complex systems is used in critical infrastructure system
(CIS) approaches as a way of understanding their resilience
(Chang et al., 2007). In order to describe impacts across
many different infrastructure systems, interdisciplinary ex-
pertise is needed and a large amount of descriptive data is
required (Santella et al., 2009). Table top exercises with ex-
perts from multiple infrastructures are used, but are expen-
sive (in terms of both time and money) and logistically diffi-
cult to organise. As a result, models of interdependent critical
infrastructure systems are proposed as tools to aid decision-
making and to supplement, or even to replace, expert judge-
ment (Santella et al., 2009). Such models account for sys-
tem dynamics through simple feedback loops, and stocks and
flows into the system in order to model the effects of failures
across interdependent systems, and to trial interventions. Yet
challenges in obtaining data for a variety of different infras-
tructures, and in disaster events, has resulted in limited vali-
dation of such models (Santella et al., 2009).
Empirical studies of CIS interdependencies use case study
data from past disaster events, which are derived from hur-
ricane, ice storm and earthquake events (Chang et al., 2007;
McDaniels et al., 2008; Oh et al., 2010). These studies pre-
dominantly explore interdependent relationships in order to
identify impacts of disruption from a hazard, critical points
of vulnerability, and ways to manage or reduce risk through
decision-making (Oh et al., 2010; McDaniels et al., 2008)
and mitigation (Chang et al., 2007). One study provides
a framework for understanding the disruption to one in-
frastructure system (power outage) and the cascading im-
pacts that result across connected infrastructures (Chang et
al., 2007). Another study creates decision diagrams for one
infrastructure system, considering the impacts on this sys-
tem from external disruption, but does not consider how this
system affects wider society or how multiple infrastructure
systems may affect each other (McDaniels et al., 2008). In
these studies, considering consequences to one infrastruc-
ture system, rather than many infrastructures at once, sim-
plifies the complexity of a disaster. A study that considers
several interdependent infrastructure sectors focuses on inter-
dependencies between directly impacted sectors (e.g. build-
ings, bridges, levees, power, communications, road, oil facil-
ities) and the physical impacts to infrastructure affected by
their disruption (e.g. healthcare, food, agriculture, transporta-
tion, communication, oil refinery, retail) (Oh et al., 2010).
Yet limitations in considering only physical interdependen-
cies between many infrastructure systems, rather than the
many other ways in which infrastructure systems communi-
cate, coordinate and interact, results in simplified scenarios
for decision-making. In accordance with the epistemologi-
cal framing of the resilience concept within CIS, resilience
is measured by looking at redundancy and restoration of ser-
vices (Reed et al., 2009; Bruneau et al., 2003). Focus is on the
vulnerabilities identified from cascading impacts, and there
is little focus on learning and adaptation, or on the social and
political dimensions of vulnerability and resilience.
A few disaster and socio-ecological systems studies have
identified the importance of adaptation in networks of sys-
tems. These show that the number of links between sys-
tems increases during periods of reorganisation in crises,
as sleeping links become activated to exchange information
(Janssen et al., 2006; Kartez, 1984). For example, a study
of the response of 26 local governments to the eruption of
Mt St Helen’s in 1980 finds that adaptive relationships were
developed for responding to the disaster. These formed along
pre-existing lines of organisational communication and took
place entirely at the local level, outside the institutional con-
text of emergency planning at state and federal level (Kartez,
1984). Such studies demonstrate the adaptive capacity of a
network and the context-specific nature of the response.
To our knowledge, there are no in-depth empirical stud-
ies of essential service interdependence in disasters that ac-
count for the complexity of interactions, and the adaptive
behaviour of a network of essential services. Cause and ef-
fect models are unable to adequately account for non-linear
behaviour (Cavallo and Ireland, 2014). As a result, studies
of complexity need to be approached through analogy and
narratives (Allen, 2008). Further, there has been no consid-
eration of non-extreme disaster events and the effects that
smaller, more frequent event types may have on interdepen-
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dent essential services. These effects are likely to be lower
impact but more widespread – constituting environments of
extensive risk.
Extensive risk is defined as follows:
The widespread risk associated with the exposure
of dispersed populations to repeated or persistent
hazard conditions of low or moderate intensity, of-
ten of a highly localised nature, which can lead to
debilitating cumulative disaster impacts” (United
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduc-
tion, 2009b, p. 15–16).
Extensive risk is associated with widespread low-intensity
losses that may include a large number of affected people,
damage to infrastructure or housing. The 2013 Global As-
sessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction finds that in
56 case studies, more than 90 % of local damage to roads,
telecommunications, power and water supplies derived from
extensive risk (United Nations International Strategy for Dis-
aster Reduction, 2013). In the 2009 sample of case studies,
65 % of all hospital losses in disasters are attributed to exten-
sive risk (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction, 2009a).
Extensive risk contexts are mainly associated with climate
and weather-related hazards, and predominantly, although
not exclusively, with localised hazards (United Nations Inter-
national Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2013). In volcanic
contexts, some volcanic hazards are intensive (high sever-
ity, low frequency), such as explosions or pyroclastic flows,
and some are extensive (low impact, high frequency), such
as ashfalls, gases and acid rain. In long-duration volcanic
eruptions (i.e. ongoing for many years e.g. Tungurahua Vol-
cano, Ecuador, 1999–present; and Soufriere Hills Volcano,
Montserrat, 1995–present), the frequency and widespread
exposure of people and assets to low-impact ashfalls con-
stitute environments of extensive risk. To date, the effects of
ongoing volcanic activity (frequent primary ashfalls or wind-
blown remobilisation of ash) on society, or on the essential
services that support modern urban living, have been scarcely
explored (Tobin and Whiteford, 2004; Wilson et al., 2011;
Sword-Daniels, 2014; Sword-Daniels et al., 2011).
Volcanic ashfalls are capable of disrupting or even damag-
ing the essential services upon which society depends (Wil-
son et al., 2012; Ronan et al., 2000; Blong, 1984). Several
eruptions have illustrated the vulnerability of urban areas that
receive only a few millimetres or centimetres of volcanic ash.
Empirical case studies of volcanic ash impacts have been
conducted at the following sites: Soufrière Hills Volcano,
Montserrat, West Indies, 2010–2012; Tungurahua Volcano,
Ecuador, 2010; Pacaya Volcano, Guatemala, 2010; Reven-
tador Volcano, Ecuador, 2002; Mt. Ruapehu, New Zealand,
1995–1996; and Mt. Hudson, Chile, 1991 (Johnston, 1997;
Johnston et al., 2000, 2004; Leonard et al., 2005; Stewart
et al., 2006; Sword-Daniels et al., 2011, 2014; Wardman et
al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2009, 2010). Ashfall impact studies
have included aspects of structural loading, electrical power
networks, water and wastewater systems, telecommunica-
tions networks, aircraft, land transportation, heating ventila-
tion and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, and laptop com-
puters. Studies have focussed mainly on single ashfall events,
and were recently summarised by Wilson et al. (2012).
Ash impacts to complex essential service sectors such
as healthcare systems have only recently been explored,
through case studies in Montserrat, Guatemala and Ecuador
(Sword-Daniels et al., 2011; Wardman et al., 2012; Sword-
Daniels, 2014). Few studies consider the cascading effects of
volcanic impacts across sectors, and there is little empirical
knowledge of the interdependent effects of volcanic hazards
for essential services and society (Johnston, 1997; Auck-
land Engineering Lifelines Group, 1999; Wilson et al., 2012;
Sword-Daniels, 2014).
3 Case study context
Montserrat is a small British overseas territory in the West
Indies (Fig. 1). It has a colonial history and a complex dual
government system with a British governor (appointed by
the UK government) and the locally elected government
of Montserrat (GoM). The sudden onset eruption of the
Soufrière Hills Volcano began on 18 July 1995 (Sparks and
Young, 2002) and large-scale evacuations from inhabited ar-
eas closest to the volcano ensued. In 1996 an exclusion zone
was established, and the majority of the population, including
all the inhabitants of the capital, Plymouth, were permanently
relocated further from the volcano (Aspinall et al., 2002), to
a little-developed landscape in the north of the island (Clay
et al., 1999).
The eruption, which is ongoing at the time of writing,
triggered a protracted disaster that has been exacerbated by
the dual governance system, large-scale population emigra-
tion, and significant economic decline (Clay et al., 1999;
Druitt and Kokelaar, 2002; Wisner et al., 2004; Haynes,
2005, 2006; Sword-Daniels et al., 2014). The British govern-
ment currently supports Montserrat’s economy through the
Department for International Development (DFID), provid-
ing around 60 % of the recurrent budget (Clay et al., 1999;
Sword-Daniels, 2014).
Despite the relocation, resettlement in the north of the is-
land does not prevent the population from being affected
by volcanic hazards. Although further from the volcano and
largely removed from and potential high-impact hazards such
as pyroclastic flows, the population is still intermittently ex-
posed to ashfalls, gases and acid rain. These hazards are rel-
atively low impact but are geographically widespread and
extend beyond the boundaries of the exclusion zone. This
constitutes an environment of extensive volcanic risk, where
such hazards affect populated areas and cause disruptions to
many different essential services upon which society depends
(Sword-Daniels et al., 2014).
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Figure 1. Map of Montserrat, showing the exclusion zone (Montserrat Volcano Observatory, 2014), village and essential service locations
in 2012.
Montserrat provides a case study of essential services op-
erating under conditions of extensive volcanic risk. This con-
text allows in-depth exploration of the dynamics and interde-
pendence of essential services under intermittent ashfall haz-
ard conditions, where the interconnected network of essential
services are bounded by the geographic extent of the island.
4 Methodology
This study is centred on the healthcare system as a criti-
cal and complex system with key roles in disaster response
as well as the long-term well-being of society (Achour and
Price, 2010). Disruption of the healthcare system has a direct
impact on the community. The healthcare system is nested
within a wider network of interconnected sectors with which
it interacts. These sectors are interdependent: drawing on the
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resources of one another in order to provide the services that
support urban living.
In this study, a systems thinking approach is taken, which
provides a flexible and dynamic framework that allows a
problem to be explored holistically (Checkland, 1999). Sys-
tems are conceptualised as interacting elements, which work
together to produce emergent properties that characterise the
system: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Mead-
ows, 2009; Checkland, 1999; Simonovic, 2011). A systems
approach allows the nature and dynamics of a network of es-
sential services in a chronic volcanic ashfall environment to
be understood by focusing on the interactions between sec-
tors (their interrelationships). The interactions are not only
within the system itself (the interrelated elements of its con-
struction), but also between the system and its context, con-
sequently the boundaries of the study need to be defined.
Essential services are complex adaptive systems, where
the dynamic relationships between elements in each system
(infrastructure sector) are self-learning and lead to emer-
gent behaviours, consequently they respond to change non-
linearly (Checkland, 1999; Kay, 2008b; Simonovic, 2011).
The ways in which a network of complex adaptive sys-
tems interact, and the self-organising behaviour that emerges
through their dynamic interrelationships and feedback loops
is complex. The state of complex adaptive systems is a func-
tion of their history and they evolve over time. Behaviour
prediction is not possible with such systems (Kay, 2008a).
In Montserrat the healthcare system consists of one hospi-
tal (secondary care), two elderly care homes (one public, one
private), four clinics (primary care) and a headquarters. In-
teractions between the healthcare system, and the supporting
network of essential services on the island, forms a bounded
sample of system of systems (SoS) that are included in this
study. Detailed consideration of interactions with wider soci-
ety and the general public are not included within the scope
and boundaries of this study.
Systems are hierarchical: each level of hierarchy is more
complex than the level below and is defined by its emergent
properties (Checkland, 1999). Essential services in Montser-
rat are considered in a hierarchy, where each level of the hi-
erarchy is more complex and consequently data capture is
less complete (Waltner-Toews et al., 2008). Several hierar-
chical levels are included within the boundaries of the sam-
ple: healthcare; health-connected sectors (sectors that col-
laborate with the healthcare sector in order to deliver pub-
lic health services); lifelines and emergency management
(LLEM); and the political, economic, social, environmental
context (Fig. 2).
4.1 Methods
A case study methodology and qualitative methods were
used to gather empirical data on the interrelationships be-
tween essential service sectors in Montserrat. Methods in-
cluded semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and transect
Figure 2. Defined levels of hierarchy, centred on the healthcare sys-
tem, with increasing in complexity at each level beyond the health-
care system.
walks, as well as secondary data sources (McCracken, 1988;
Sarantakos, 2005; Chambers, 1994). The methods were cho-
sen to elicit in-depth descriptive data of how essential ser-
vices function within the volcanic context, and explored top-
ics including the following: consequences of volcanic ac-
tivity, responses to activity and ways of reducing the ef-
fects, and the sectors with which each essential service sector
works, both in the presence and absence of volcanic activity.
Wider discussions also included the benefits and challenges
of working alongside volcanic hazards and the outlook and
wants and needs for the future. Each topic prompted differ-
ent perspectives on how each essential service functions in
Montserrat.
Semi-structured interviews allowed an experienced (long-
serving) member of each essential service sector to discuss
each topic freely, and for the researcher to tailor the inter-
view as relevant issues emerged during discussion. This al-
lowed rich data to be gathered from the perspective of an
expert informant. Focus groups allowed interactive engage-
ment of a group of expert informants as they discussed the
topic. Following discussion of the topic, this provided an
opportunity for facilitator-led discussion explicitly of rela-
tionships between sectors: listing the essential service sec-
tors with which their department worked. This promoted a
discussion of many different relationships across essential
service sectors on the island, and detailed description of the
role or purpose of the working relationships between each
sector. Relationships that exist during times of low volcanic
activity were explicitly sought, as well as relationships that
exist during heightened volcanic activity. This structure was
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adopted to elicit data about everyday relationships, as well
as those that are perhaps more obvious during times of cri-
sis and therefore may be preferentially recalled or described.
Yet although this approach minimises a potential reporting
bias during data collection, some implicit relationships may
not be fully represented within the data. Finally, two transect
walks were conducted, which allowed essential service staff
to show the researcher around each facility in a more infor-
mal, demonstrative and explanatory way than gained through
interview and focus group methods.
This array of methods formed part of a wider study of the
resilience of the healthcare system (Sword-Daniels, 2014),
with each method and each stage of data collection engaging
the participants in a different way, and under different haz-
ard conditions (e.g. during intermittent ashfalls and during
quiescence). The design allowed triangulation of methods to
cross-check the findings of different data types.
In each method of data collection, discussion of the ex-
istence, and description of the nature of the working rela-
tionship(s) between sectors was sought explicitly to derive
understanding of the ways in which essential services com-
municate, collaborate and share resources. This constitutes
“relationship data”, where each identified connection (rela-
tionship) is associated with information about which sector
the connection comes from and to (the direction of resource
flow), along with a description of the purpose or role of the
connection, and whether the relationship is reciprocal or one
way (unidirectional). This provided detailed descriptions of
the interrelationships between essential service sectors. Ad-
ditional connections between sectors were derived from sec-
ondary data documents, and the structure of GoM depart-
ments within overarching Ministries (Disaster Management
Coordination Agency, 2011; Ministry of Health, 2008; GoM,
2014). Further additions to the data included common-sense
relationships (i.e. reliance on water or power) and knowledge
of the context (e.g. the Disaster Management Coordination
Agency (DMCA) coordinates all departments in emergen-
cies, and ZJB Radio is the national platform for hazard com-
munication in Montserrat). This augments the data collected
from qualitative interview and focus group methods.
Data were collected and validated in three stages. The first
stage of data collection was conducted between 27 February
and 12 March 2010 and involved 14 semi-structured inter-
views and one transect walk with 11 essential service sec-
tors on the island (Table 1). This stage revealed a number of
connections between essential service sectors on Montserrat.
Other sectors not included in the first stage of fieldwork, but
identified as being connected to a sector included in this ini-
tial sample, or identified from the literature, were included in
the second stage of fieldwork to further explore the network
of connected sectors. This is known as “snowball sampling”
(Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). The second stage of fieldwork
was conducted from 4 October to 6 December 2011 and
included four focus groups with healthcare staff, a further
transect walk and semi-structured interviews. Relationships
with sectors included in the first stage of fieldwork, and with
others included in the sample for the second stage of field-
work, were explicitly sought for validation and to gain fur-
ther detailed description about the relationship(s). A third
stage of fieldwork conducted from 27 September to 3 Oc-
tober 2012 sought participant feedback based-on initial re-
sults, also known as respondent validation (Bryman, 2012),
this further validated the relationship data. One further essen-
tial service sector was also able to be included at this time, as
they were unavailable during previous stages of data collec-
tion (Table 1).
In all data collection stages a total of 23 semi-structured
interviews were conducted with healthcare staff, and 29 in-
terviews with 22 other essential services included in the sam-
ple. Table 1 shows the sampled sectors and their hierarchical
level (with relationship data completeness indicated). Partic-
ipant data is shown in Table 2. High female representation
reflects the composition of healthcare workers on the island
(for example, all clinic staff are female).
5 Results
To analyse the relationship data, an explanatory diagram of
the connections between sectors was created. Drawing on a
social network tool for graphical analysis, a digraph (Knoke
and Yang, 2008) was constructed from the relationship data,
which shows the direction of relationships between nodes in
the network. Each essential service sector is represented by
a node, and links are drawn between two connected sectors.
Arrows point in the direction of resource flow between the
sectors. This creates a complex picture of interdependence
on Montserrat. Some relationships are documented with sec-
tors that are not included in the sample but are represented on
the digraph for completeness (Fig. 3). Relationships change
over time and any study of complex adaptive systems pro-
vides a static view of a dynamic system, and as such data are
limited in their accuracy over time. Yet study of such interre-
lationships allows understanding of their dynamic behaviour,
and of whether their connectedness lends vulnerabilities or
capacities to the network as a whole.
The diagraph conveys the complexity of relationships be-
tween essential services in Montserrat, but a new approach
was required that allowed the dynamics of a network of in-
terconnected systems to be analysed for further explanatory
power. To enable further analysis, drawing on existing classi-
fication systems in the CIS literature, categories were devel-
oped from the empirical data as thematic relationship types.
These empirical categories form a new classification of inter-
dependent relationship types, in order to analyse the dynam-
ics of a network of complex systems.
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Table 1. Sectors included in the sample and their hierarchical level. Italics are used to indicate incomplete relationship data capture. The
stage at which data were collected from each sector is also shown.
Essential service sectors included in the sample Hierarchy level Stage of fieldwork
when data were collected
Healthcare (primary, secondary and headquarters) Healthcare 1, 2
Community Services Health-connected 2
Montserrat Red Cross Health-connected 2
Environmental Health Health-connected 2
Golden Years Home (private elderly care home) Health-connected 2
Prison Health-connected 2
Montserrat Utilities Limited (MUL) Power LLEM 1, 2
Montserrat Utilities Limited (MUL) Water LLEM 1, 2
LIME (telecommunications) LLEM 3
ZJB Radio LLEM 1
Airport LLEM 2
Fire Search and Rescue (SAR) LLEM 1, 2
Police LLEM 2
Disaster Management Coordination Agency (DMCA) LLEM 1, 2
Montserrat Volcano Observatory (MVO) LLEM 1
Planning policy unit (PPU) LLEM 2
Public Works Department (PWD) LLEM 1, 2
Sea port LLEM 2
Ministry of Finance Context 2
Governor’s Office Context 1, 2
Education (schools) Context 1
Agriculture Context 1
Table 2. Participant demographic information relevant to this study.
No. of Male Female No. living No. moved Montserratian Non-Montserratian
participants on Montserrat to Montserrat
pre-1995 after 1995
Interview participants 52 27 25 42 (81 %) 10 (19 %) 39 13
Focus group participants 28 1 27 12 (43 %) 16 (57 %) 17 11
Transect walk participants 2 2 0 1 1 1 1
Total 78a 30 48 51 27 53 25
(38 %) (62 %) (65 %) (35 %) (68 %) (32 %)b
a Four focus group participants were additionally interviewed, and are subtracted from the final totals to avoid double-counting.
b One participant of unknown nationality was included as non-Montserratian.
5.1 Developing a classification system for analysis
Several classifications of interdependence types exist in the
CIS literature (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006;
Wallace and Wallace, 2008; Eusgeld et al., 2011; Pederson et
al., 2006). Of these a comprehensive and widely used sys-
tem is that of Rinaldi et al. (2001), which defines the fol-
lowing types of interdependencies: physical, cyber, logical,
and geographic. This classification system is modified for use
in Montserrat, drawing on other classifications and tailoring
these to the context. The “geographic” category is not used
for analysis in this context as all systems are located within
close geographic proximity to each other. “Cyber” connec-
tions result from automated infrastructure control systems,
which are not widely present in Montserrat and therefore not
used. “Logical” refers to any other connection and is con-
sidered too general for use here. Additionally, a “societal”
category is used by Pederson et al. (2006) to describe the in-
fluence that one service may have on societal factors such
as public opinion, public confidence, or cultural issues that
cause an effect in another infrastructure. However, this study
is bounded by a focus on essential services and therefore
does not include the general public. The impact on society
therefore cannot be included here, which is a limitation of
this study. Yet within the essential services data relationships
are identified that perform specific social functions (for the
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Figure 3. Digraph of relationships between essential services in Montserrat. Centred on the healthcare system, the boundary of the sample is
delineated. Black arrows indicate general relationships, purple arrows indicate volcanic relationships, and green arrows are those identified
from secondary sources.
greater social good). These are therefore included as a modi-
fied ‘social’ category within this context.
Empirical data was used to develop relevant categories for
analysis within the Montserrat context. The new classifica-
tion system developed for use in this study is as follows:
– physical – infrastructure systems linked through
their material outputs (i.e. power, water) (Rinaldi et
al., 2001). This includes physical resources;
– information – linked through the transmission of infor-
mation (broadcasting, and other communication mech-
anisms for disaster coordination);
– organisational – linkages created through collabora-
tions, working relationships or technical advice, or link-
ages through an overarching government ministry;
– financial – transfer of finances, funding, or any other
economic transaction between essential services;
– social – collaborations or shared resources specifically
to care for those in need (e.g. care of elderly and mental
healthcare clients) as well as the role of individuals who
create links with other sectors.
These classification types are then further categorised by haz-
ard conditions for more detailed analysis in an extensive risk
context. Volcanic and general relationships are differentiated
in order to explore dynamic changes in relationships with
changing levels of volcanic activity. Yet in this ongoing erup-
tion context relationships that are evident during low vol-
canic activity may have an implicit function when volcanic
activity increases: general relationships may not be wholly
independent from the volcanic context. However, the distinc-
tion between these two typologies provides a useful frame-
work for analysis of those relationships that are active during
low volcanic activity, and those that emerge or become visi-
ble during heightened volcanic activity. These two types are
therefore differentiated as those that are active (or visible)
under each of these hazard conditions. Volcanic refers to re-
lationships that become active (or are visible) during height-
ened volcanic activity; general refers to relationships that are
active in the absence of volcanic activity. For example, gen-
eral relationships may include the following:
– physical – provision of basic lifeline services, telecom-
munications and supplies;
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– organisational – responsibilities for maintenance, work-
ing collaborations, technical advice;
– information – communication of general service mes-
sages via ZJB Radio to the public;
– financial – budgetary relationships;
– social – social needs e.g. the welfare system, employ-
ment and housing.
Volcanic relationships may include the following:
– physical – physical resources and equipment for ashfall
clean-up;
– organisational – responsibilities for ashfall clean-up and
shelter management, or emergency response training;
– information – hazard communication (warnings and
alerts);
– financial – emergency financial relationships;
– social – voluntary cleaning of ash from vulnerable sec-
tors.
Subdivision of relationships into type (physical, organisa-
tional, information, financial, social) and condition (volcanic
and general) allows detailed analysis of the multiple ways
in which infrastructure sectors may be connected, and un-
der which hazard conditions they interact. This allows de-
tailed analysis of interdependence in an extensive risk envi-
ronment. The following section analyses the relationship data
using this new classification system, in order to explore the
dynamics of infrastructure interdependence in the presence
and absence of ashfall hazards.
5.2 Dynamic relationships
Between all 22 sectors explored in this analysis, there are a
total of 331 relationships identified across the network. The
classification of relationships by type for the whole network
is shown in Table 3. Overall, the contribution of organisa-
tional relationship types is the largest, at 46 % of all relation-
ships. Physical relationships account for 26 % – a quarter of
all connections. Information relationships account for 17 %
of the overall relationships, and Financial and Social cate-
gories form the remaining 11 % of connections across the
network.
Of the total of 331 individual connections between the
22 essential services sectors in Montserrat, 235 pre-exist in
the absence of volcanic activity, and are classed as general
relationships. The essential services in Montserrat are seen
to be highly interconnected. During heightened volcanic ac-
tivity, an additional 96 relationships are formed between the
essential service sectors in the network, an increase of 41 %
in the total number of relationships.
Table 3. The total number of relationships across all of the essential
services included in the sample, and their classification type.
Type of Total no. of % of
relationship relationships relationships







The number of relationships received by each sector from
the network of essential services is disaggregated by condi-
tion into general and volcanic relationships in Table 4. There
is no clear correlation between sectors that have higher num-
bers of general relationships and the number of volcanic re-
lationships that form in response to heightened activity.
Sectors are connected if there is at least one tie between
any two sectors. There are a total of 132 pairs of connected
sectors in this network during low volcanic activity (general
relationships), of a possible 462, if every sector had a connec-
tion to every other. The nature of relationship transformations
varies: some pairs of sectors adapt pre-existing general rela-
tionships during heightened volcanic activity, and some new
connections form between previously unconnected sectors.
In this way, relationships between sectors may dynamically
change in response to hazard events.
During volcanic activity, 17 pairs of connected sectors
are seen to adapt their pre-existing relationship(s) to include
at least one volcanic relationship (13 %). For example the
DMCA owns and maintains the generator that it shares with
the hospital. This is a general relationship. However, in a vol-
canic emergency the hospital takes the lead agency response
role for mass casualty situations, supported by the DMCA.
This is a volcanic relationship. In another example, both
MUL Water and MUL Power provide the general power and
water supply around the island, including to the ZJB radio
station facility. However, during heightened volcanic activity
the nature of the relationships between the sectors changes,
and MUL Water and MUL Power rely on ZJB Radio to pro-
vide hazard information, and to communicate water advisory
notices or power outage notices to the public. Additionally
MUL Water will hose down the radio transmitter site on Sil-
ver Hills (Fig. 1) to clear it of ash for ZJB Radio. These are
dynamic shifts in interrelationships between periods of low
or heightened volcanic activity.
In other cases, new relationships are formed between sec-
tors. A total of 39 newly connected pairs of sectors are cre-
ated: spontaneously linking previously unconnected pairs.
For example, Environmental Health is called-in to assess
whether schools need to close due to ashfall, and Commu-
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Table 4. The total number of relationships received by each sector from the network of essential services, disaggregated by relationship
condition (volcanic and general). Italics are used to indicate incomplete relationship data capture.
Infrastructure sector No. of general No. of volcanic Sum of all
relationships relationships relationships
Healthcare 31 11 42
Airport 16 6 22
Montserrat Utilities Limited (MUL) Water 15 3 18
Community Services 13 4 17
Police 13 6 19
Sea Port 13 1 13
Environmental Health 12 3 15
Fire Search and Rescue (SAR) 12 3 15
Public Works Department (PWD) 11 6 17
Education (schools) 10 5 15
Montserrat Utilities Limited (MUL) Power 10 3 13
Planning policy unit (PPU) 10 1 11
Agriculture Department 9 1 10
Golden Years Home 9 2 11
Governor’s Office 8 3 11
Ministry of Finance 8 1 9
Prison 8 1 9
Disaster Management Coordination Agency (DMCA) 6 23 29
LIME (telecommunications) 6 4 10
Montserrat Volcano Observatory (MVO) 6 5 11
Montserrat Red Cross 6 2 8
ZJB Radio 4 2 6
Total 236 96 331
Table 5. The total number of general and volcanic relationships across the essential service sectors, classified by type.
Type of No. volcanic % of each type of No. general % of each type of
relationship relationships volcanic relationship relationships general relationships
Physical 10 10 76 32
Organisational 44 46 108 46
Information 33 34 23 10
Financial 2 2 26 11
Social 7 7 2 1
Total 96 99a 235 100
a does not sum to 100 % due to rounding.
nity Services may also request help with the shelters from
Environmental Health. Neither of these relationships were
enacted (or functionally active) during low volcanic activ-
ity. In other examples, the police take on additional responsi-
bilities during volcanic activity. These include enforcing ac-
cess restrictions to the exclusion zone when the hazard level
changes, and also sounding the southern evacuation sirens
from Salem Police Station in emergencies, in response to
MVO’s advice.
During volcanic activity, the total number of connected
pairs in the network increases from 132 to 171. Of these, a
total of 56 pairs have at least one volcanic relationship (33 %
of connected pairs).
Further exploring the types of relationships that exist in
pre-stressed (general) and stressed (volcanic) states reveals
that different types of relationship are enacted under differ-
ent environmental conditions. Table 5 shows the number of
volcanic and general relationships within each classified re-
lationship type.
For general relationships, organisational and physical re-
lationship types contribute the most to the total number of
connections across the network. However, the relationships
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that form during volcanic activity are dominated by organi-
sational and informational linkages. These volcanic relation-
ships include requests for assistance (e.g. ash clean-up or
technical assessments), emergency roles and finances, and
hazard communication. For example LIME (telecommunica-
tions) sends SMS blasts to the DMCA for hazard communi-
cation, and ZJB Radio broadcasts hazard updates to the pub-
lic. The fire department are paid by LIME to clean ash block-
ages, and the Ministry of Finance provides financial support
for emergency response actions. Relationships across the net-
work therefore transform in both number and type during
heightened volcanic activity.
6 Discussion
The results of this study show that essential services on
Montserrat have many connections between them, and that
their complex relationships have a range of types: social,
physical, financial, organisational, and informational. Subdi-
vision of relationships into this new classification of interde-
pendence types and condition (volcanic and general) allows
detailed analysis of the multiple ways in which infrastructure
sectors may be connected, and under what hazard conditions
they interact. This provides a unique perspective on infras-
tructure interdependence in an extensive risk context.
Many of the relationships between essential services in
Montserrat could not be detected from literature, or derived
from logical physical or organisational connections between
systems. A context-specific view of interrelationships is nec-
essary to be able to understand the complexity and variety of
interdependencies between essential services. In Montserrat,
physical relationships between essential services account for
only a quarter of all relationships across the network. This
is equalled by contributions of financial, information and so-
cial linkages, each of which are largely unique to the context.
Organisational linkages form the predominant type of con-
nection between sectors. Models of interdependent systems,
and impact studies using secondary data cannot capture this
complexity: accounting for this diversity in interdependent
relationship types, which defines the nature of a complex net-
work.
In Montserrat, during increased volcanic activity, relation-
ships transform in their type and their function, increasing
communication and information sharing by augmenting and
adapting network relationships. The unique context of ex-
tensive risk on a small island is likely to play a role in fos-
tering such linkages. Yet the adaptive behaviour of systems
has been observed in the United States, albeit in response
to a single disaster event (Kartez, 1984). In Montserrat re-
lationships have been enacted many times over the course
of the long-duration eruption. In this context, the lack of
correlation between sectors with high numbers of general
relationships and the formation of emergent volcanic rela-
tionships, demonstrates the dynamic and complex nature of
interdependence in response to hazards. Complex and non-
linear behaviour is seen to emerge from this network dur-
ing periods of heightened stress. The spontaneous formation
of links between seemingly unconnected sectors may derive
from historic linkages that act as sleeping links, which may
not be evident until stressed. Although data gathering is im-
proved by adopting an in-depth qualitative approach, and by
explicitly seeking everyday as well as response-based rela-
tionships, such sleeping links may remain “invisible” (not
fully represented during data collection) until they are en-
acted. This means that identifying relationships and develop-
ing an understanding of the adaptive behaviour of a network
is challenging in a pre-disaster context. Improving data cap-
ture of these types of links may require in-depth data gather-
ing approaches coupled with detailed exploration of histori-
cal events and relationships.
Another important consideration is the relative signifi-
cance of relationships to the successful function of the net-
work and of society. This study is bounded by a sample of
essential services and does not include detailed exploration
of interactions with wider society. The interpretation of re-
lationship significance is beyond the scope of this study, yet
it is clear that not all relationships contribute equally to im-
proving or disrupting the function of essential services across
the network. Some connections are more or less critical, un-
der different circumstances, and at different points in time.
For example, for the function of the essential services net-
work in short-term volcanic emergencies, disaster coordina-
tion (DMCA), information dissemination (e.g. telecommuni-
cations, radio) and lifeline services (e.g. power, water) may
be critical to the daily operations of many other facilities. In
the longer-term, collaborations between sectors to perform
maintenance functions and longer-term operations increases
in importance to sustain infrastructure functions. Beyond im-
plications of relationship function for the network of con-
nected sectors, impacts for society are critical considerations.
Healthcare performs essential functions in both short-term
volcanic emergencies and for the long-term wellbeing of so-
ciety: disruption of this sector has a direct impact on society.
Other sectors may suffer disruption without significant soci-
etal impacts during the short-term, such as planning depart-
ments or justice and courts. Interpreting differentials in rela-
tionship significance across the network requires a detailed
analysis of context-specific data in order to understand the
consequences of relationship disruption. This reflects a lim-
itation of this study, and is an important avenue for further
enquiry. Such reflections on relationship importance should
be considered in terms of consequences for each sector, for
the network of essential services as a whole, and for wider
society.
To identify whether essential service interdependence
within the local context contributes to increased vulnerabil-
ity or increased capacity of systems, the drivers of system be-
haviour need to be understood. In Montserrat, there are many
examples of essential services that apply their core skills to
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respond to emergent needs. Examples of this response be-
haviour include the following.
– Fire search and rescue (SAR) volunteer to perform the
clean-up of ash in vulnerable areas (hospital, schools,
clinics, mental healthcare duplexes, government build-
ings).
– Police assist clinic mental healthcare nurses with find-
ing and medicating patients during volcanic activity, or
in emergency shelters.
– Public notices are broadcast on ZJB Radio by each dis-
rupted sector to inform their clients of any service ef-
fects.
– Ash advisories are given out on ZJB Radio during par-
ticularly active times for public information.
– MUL water fills the water tanks at healthcare facilities
during ashfalls (and hurricanes).
– Several sectors work together when the shelters are in
use, each with clearly defined roles and responsibilities
(Red Cross, environmental health, primary healthcare).
In particular, ashfall clean-up is prioritised for sectors that
are considered to be vulnerable, which include the airport,
healthcare, geriatric homes and schools. For example, the as-
sessment of whether schools need to close in ashfall (con-
ducted by Environmental Health) was developed as a result
of concerns over the effects of ashfalls on children’s health.
The prioritisation appears to reflect a collective concern for
others within Montserrat’s society (Sword-Daniels, 2014).
These priorities and values affect the behaviour of the essen-
tial service network. In Montserrat, vulnerable sectors gain
additional capacities from the wider network of essential ser-
vices during volcanic activity. In other cases, sectors that in
advance of a disaster may be identified as likely to be more
greatly affected, may therefore be preferentially supported
by local mechanisms. However, this adaptive capacity may
be unique to this context: the behaviour of the network is de-
pendent on the values of society, which drives the response
of essential services.
By taking an in-depth view of the relationships between
systems, drawing on the knowledge and experience of many
expert participants within the context, a rich picture of es-
sential service interdependence can be developed. Such ap-
proaches are time consuming and costly, they require engage-
ment with experienced expert participants across a range of
different essential services, and a staged approach to data
capture in order to develop an appropriate sample of inter-
connected sectors within the context. Yet such detailed study
allows far greater understanding of the complexity of rela-
tionship types, their dynamic interactions in the presence and
absence of hazards, and contextual understanding of the be-
haviour of a whole network of complex adaptive systems.
It is therefore recommended that future studies of essential
service interdependence take a more nuanced, interpretive
perspective to understanding complex problems, rather than
traditional positivist approaches (Cavallo and Ireland, 2014).
This will enable better understanding of complexity and dy-
namic behaviour. A social network study finds that there is
no clear correlation between the connectedness of a network
and its resilience, and that resilience must be understood and
interpreted in context (Janssen et al., 2006). In-depth under-
standing of each case study can reveal whether interdepen-
dencies in each context contribute capacities or vulnerabili-
ties to the essential service network, allowing resilience to be
interpreted.
In future studies the classification of relationships by type
and condition has multiple uses, from mapping out infor-
mation and communication flow across a network, to under-
standing disaster economics. This type of analysis can shed
light on the role of individuals or of individual sectors within
a network as critical connectors. Further, network analysis
could allow the identification of critical nodes within a net-
work: those that enable function of a wide range of other
sectors, and those that are supported by resources from many
other sectors. This could improve knowledge of how best to
increase resilience across a network of interconnected sys-
tems within each unique context, accounting for the dynam-
ics and behaviour of the interconnected whole.
7 Conclusions
This empirical study explores the interdependence and adap-
tive behaviour of a network of essential services in Montser-
rat, West Indies. This study presents a new methodology
through which interdependent relationships may be explored,
by drawing on in-depth descriptive data and engagement with
expert participants. We find that many different types of rela-
tionships exist between essential services. In order to under-
stand this complexity, we develop a new classification system
for analysis drawing from the literature and empirical data.
Relationships are further categorised by hazard conditions
(increases and decreases in volcanic activity). This provides
a novel framework for exploring the dynamics and complex-
ity of interdependent relationships in an extensive risk envi-
ronment. Such a framework can be adapted for use in other
hazard contexts.
Interdependent essential services are seen to behave non-
linearly, transforming their relationships in both type and
number when exposed to hazards. In this context, emergent
relationships increase communication and organisational co-
operation across the network, adapting to increase the capaci-
ties for response. Interdependencies are therefore seen to add
capacities to certain prioritised sectors in the network (e.g.
healthcare, schools), which increases their resilience.
Further analysis could develop mechanisms for comparing
the importance or significance of relationships to the func-
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tion of the network as a whole, as well as to the societies that
essential services support. The degree to which each relation-
ship is capable of improving or disrupting social and infras-
tructure function would require further in-depth and context-
specific study and would be a valuable avenue of enquiry that
would add depth to our understanding of interdependent sys-
tems.
Future studies of interdependence should account for the
diversity of ways in which sectors may interact with each
other, beyond considering just physical and organisational
linkages, and must account for both the vulnerabilities and
the capacities created by interdependence in order to inter-
pret resilience. Further in-depth case studies will increase
knowledge of how networks of complex systems may adapt
and respond under stress in real-world contexts. This will im-
prove our understanding of the complexity of interdependent
systems within each unique context, providing pathways for
increasing their resilience.
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